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Abstract
We solve a general class of dynamic rational-inattention problems in which
an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and
selects actions. The solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model,
but it is biased towards an optimal default rule that is independent of the
realized state. The model provides the same fit to choice data as dynamic logit,
but, because of the bias, yields different counterfactual predictions. We apply
the general solution to the study of (i) the status quo bias; (ii) inertia in actions
leading to lagged adjustments to shocks; and (iii) the tradeoff between accuracy
and delay in decision-making.
∗We thank Victor Aguirregabiria, Mehmet Ekmekci, Štěpán Jurajda, Jakub Kastl, Philipp
Kircher, Alessandro Pavan, Marcin Pęski, Vasiliki Skreta, Joel Sobel, Balázs Szentes, three anony-
mous referees, and participants in various seminars and conferences for their comments. Maxim
Goryunov provided excellent research assistance. Steiner was supported by the Purkyně fellowship
of the Czech Academy of Sciences and by GAČR grants 13-34759S and 16-00703S. Stewart is grateful
to SSHRC for ﬁnancial support of this research.
†email: jakub.steiner@cerge-ei.cz
‡email: colinbstewart@gmail.com
§email: ﬁlip.matejka@cerge-ei.cz
1
1 Introduction
Timing of information plays an important role in a variety of economic settings. De-
lays in learning contribute to lags in adjustment of macroeconomic variables, in adop-
tion of new technologies, and in prices in ﬁnancial markets. The speed of information
processing is a crucial determinant of response times in psychological experiments.
In each of these cases, the timing is shaped in large part by individuals’ eﬀorts to
acquire information.
We study a general dynamic decision problem in which an agent chooses what and
how much information to acquire, as well as when to acquire it. In each period, the
agent can choose an arbitrary signal about a payoﬀ-relevant state of the world before
taking an action. At the end of each period, she observes a costless signal that may
depend on her action choice; for example, she may observe her realized ﬂow payoﬀ.
The state follows an arbitrary stochastic process, and the agent’s ﬂow payoﬀ is a
function of the histories of actions and states. Following Sims (2003), the agent pays
a cost to acquire information that is proportional to the reduction in her uncertainty
as measured by the entropy of her beliefs. We characterize the stochastic behavior
that maximizes the sum of the agent’s expected discounted utilities less the cost of
the information she acquires.
We ﬁnd that the optimal choice rule coincides with dynamic logit behavior (Rust,
1987) with respect to payoﬀs that diﬀer from the agent’s true payoﬀs by an endogenous
additive term.1 This additional term, which we refer to as a “predisposition”, depends
on the history of actions but does not depend directly on the history of states. Relative
to dynamic logit behavior with the agent’s true payoﬀs, the predisposition increases
the relative payoﬀs associated with actions that are chosen with high probability on
average across all states given the agent’s information at the corresponding time.
If states are positively serially correlated, the inﬂuence of predispositions can
resemble switching costs; because learning whether the state has changed is costly,
the agent relies in part on her past behavior to inform her current decision, and is
therefore predisposed toward repeating her previous action.
Our results provide a new foundation for the use of dynamic logit in empirical
research with an important caveat: the presence of predispositions aﬀects counter-
factual extrapolation of behavior based on identiﬁcation of utility parameters. An
1This result extends the static logit result of Matějka and McKay (2015) to the dynamic setting.
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econometrician applying standard dynamic logit techniques to the agent in our model
would correctly predict her behavior in repetitions of the same dynamic decision prob-
lem. However, problems involving diﬀerent payoﬀs or distributions of states typically
lead to diﬀerent predispositions, which must be accounted for in the extrapolation
exercise. The diﬀerence arises because the standard approach takes switching costs
as ﬁxed when other payoﬀs vary, whereas the predispositions in our model vary as
parameters of the environment change.
A major diﬃculty in solving the model and obtaining the dynamic logit character-
ization arises due to the inﬂuence of current information acquisition on future beliefs.
One approach would be to reduce the problem to a collection of static problems using
the Bellman equation, with payoﬀs equal to current payoﬀs plus continuation values
that depend on posterior beliefs. However, the resulting collection of problems can-
not be solved by directly applying techniques developed for static rational inattention
problems (henceforth, RI problems). In static RI problems, not including information
costs, expected payoﬀs are linear in beliefs; in the Bellman equation, continuation val-
ues are not linear in probabilities. Nevertheless, we show that the solution can be
obtained in a similar fashion by ignoring the eﬀect of information acquisition on future
beliefs: one can deﬁne continuation values as a function only of the histories of actions,
costless signals, and states, and treat those values as ﬁxed when optimizing at each
history. Because of this property, we can characterize the solution to the dynamic RI
problem in terms of solutions to static RI problems that are well understood.
The key step behind the reduction to static problems is to show that the dynamic
RI problem can be reformulated as a control problem with observable states. In this
reformulation, the agent ﬁrst chooses a default choice rule that speciﬁes a distribu-
tion of actions at each history independent of which states are realized. Then, after
observing the realized state in each period, she chooses her actual distribution of ac-
tions, and incurs a cost according to how much she deviates from the default choice
rule.2 Because states are observable in the control problem, beliefs do not depend on
choice behavior; as a result, this reformulation circumvents the main diﬃculty in the
original problem of accounting for the eﬀect of the current strategy on future beliefs.
We illustrate the general solution in three applications. In the ﬁrst, the agent
seeks to match her action to the state in each of two periods. We show that positive
2Mattsson and Weibull (2002) study essentially the same problem for a ﬁxed default rule in a
static setting.
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correlation between the states can lead to an apparent status quo bias: the agent never
switches her action from one period to the next, and her choice is, on average, better
in the ﬁrst period than in the second. The correlation between the states creates
a relatively strong incentive to learn in the ﬁrst period because the information she
obtains will be useful in both periods. Acquiring more information in the ﬁrst period
in turn reduces the agent’s incentive to acquire information in the second, making
her more inclined to choose the same action.3
Our second application extends the ﬁrst one to a stationary, inﬁnite-horizon set-
ting. A binary state follows a Markov chain. The agent chooses a binary action in each
period with the goal of matching the state. This model can be viewed, for instance,
as capturing an investor’s choice between two asset classes, or a consumer’s choice be-
tween two products. Unlike analogous models with exogenous information or restric-
tions on available signals, long-run behavior satisﬁes a simple Markov property: choice
probabilities in each period depend only on the action in the preceding period and the
current state. Inertia in states is reﬂected by inertia in actions. Provision of costless
information, although beneﬁcial for the agent’s payoﬀ, can have a perverse eﬀect on
behavior: relative to the case in which all information is costly, additional costless
signals can make the agent’s actions less likely to match the state. The expectation
of free signals in the future crowds out the agent’s incentive to acquire costly infor-
mation, in some cases to the extent that the overall precision of information declines.
The ﬁnal application concerns a classic question in psychology, namely, the rela-
tionship between response times and accuracy of decisions. The state is binary and
ﬁxed over time. The agent chooses when to take one of two actions with the goal of
matching her action to the state. Delaying is costly, but gives her the opportunity to
acquire more information. We focus on a variant of the model in which the cost of
information is replaced with a capacity constraint on how much information she can
acquire in each period. The solution of the problem gives the joint distribution of the
decision time, the state, and the chosen action. We ﬁnd that, for a range of delay
costs, the probability of choosing the correct action is constant over time, and so is
the hazard rate at which decisions are made (up until the ﬁnal period). In addition,
the expected delay time is non-monotone in the agent’s capacity, with intermediate
levels being associated with the longest delays.
3As in Baliga and Ely (2011), the agent’s second-period beliefs are directly linked to her earlier
decision, although the eﬀect here arises due to costly information acquisition rather than forgetting.
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We focus throughout the paper on information costs that are proportional to the
reduction in entropy of beliefs. There are two related reasons for this choice. The ﬁrst
is tractability. Since the agent in our model can choose any signal in each period, the
set of possible information acquisition strategies is very large. With entropy-based
costs, we show that one can restrict attention to strategies that associate at most one
signal realization to each action (and hence each action history is associated with just
one belief). This substantially reduces the dimensionality of the problem in that it
permits direct optimization over distributions of actions without explicitly considering
all information acquisition strategies.4 Entropy-based costs are also important for the
reformulation of the dynamic RI problem as a control problem with observable states.
The second reason for using this cost function is that it abstracts from incentives to
smooth or bunch information acquisition because of the shape of the cost function. In
a problem involving a one-time action choice, the cost function we use has the feature
that the number of opportunities to acquire information before the choice of action
is irrelevant: the cost of multiple signals spread over many periods is identical to the
cost of a single signal conveying the same information (Hobson, 1969). Similarly, in
dynamic contexts, it makes no diﬀerence whether there are multiple opportunities to
acquire information between action choices or just one; in this sense, preferences over
the timing of information acquisition across periods are driven by the payoﬀs in the
decision problem (together with discounting of costs). Although varying the shape of
the cost function could generate interesting and signiﬁcant eﬀects, our goal is to ﬁrst
understand the problem in which we abstract away from these issues.5
This paper ﬁts into the RI literature. This literature originated in the study of
macroeconomic adjustment processes (Sims, 1998, 2003). More recently, Maćkowiak
and Wiederholt (2009, 2015); Maćkowiak, Matějka, and Wiederholt (2016); and
Matějka (2015) study sluggish adjustment in dynamic RI models. Luo (2008) and
Tutino (2013) consider dynamic consumption problems with RI. Each of these pa-
pers focuses either on an environment involving linear-quadratic payoﬀs and Gaussian
shocks or on numerical solutions. A notable exception is Ravid (2014), who analyzes
4In the static case, this one-to-one association of actions and signals holds under much weaker
conditions on the cost function; see the discussion in Section 2.1.
5Moscarini and Smith (2001) focus on information costs that are convex in the volume of in-
formation and study delay in decision-making resulting from the incentive to smooth information
acquisition over time. Sundaresan and Turban (2014) study a diﬀerent model with a similar incen-
tive.
5
a class of RI stopping problems motivated by dynamic bargaining. In general static
RI problems, Matějka and McKay (2015) show that the solution generates static logit
behavior with an endogenous payoﬀ bias. Our dynamic extension of this result links
it back to the original motivation for the RI literature.
Although optimal behavior in our model ﬁts the dynamic logit framework, the
foundation is quite diﬀerent from that of Rust (1987). He derives the dynamic logit
rule in a complete information model with i.i.d. taste shocks that are unobservable
to the econometrician. Our model has no such shocks and focuses on the agent’s
information acquisition. This diﬀerence accounts for the additional payoﬀ term in
our dynamic logit result.
While information acquisition dynamics appear to be central to many economic
problems, they are rarely modeled explicitly in settings with repeated action choices.
Exceptions outside of the RI literature include Compte and Jehiel (2007), who study
information acquisition in sequential auctions, and Liu (2011), who considers infor-
mation acquisition in a reputation model. In both cases, players acquire information
at most once, in the former because information is fully revealing and in the latter
because the players are short-lived. Their focus is on strategic eﬀects, whereas we
study single-agent problems with repeated information acquisition. In a single-agent
setting, Moscarini and Smith (2001) analyze a model of optimal experimentation with
explicit information costs of learning about a ﬁxed state of the world.
As described above, a key step in proving our results is to reformulate the problem
as a control problem. This reformulation connects logit behavior in RI to that found
by Mattsson and Weibull (2002), who solve a problem with observable states in which
the agent pays an entropy-based control cost for deviating from an exogenous default
action distribution. We show that, in both static and dynamic settings, each RI
problem is equivalent to a two-stage optimization problem that combines Mattsson
and Weibull’s control problem with optimization of the default distribution. Like us,
Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) derive dynamic logit choice as a solution to a control
problem. They focus on preferences over ﬂexibility, while we focus on incomplete
information and optimization of the default choice rule.
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2 Model
A single agent chooses an action at from a ﬁnite set A in each period t = 1, 2, . . . .
6 A
payoﬀ-relevant state θt is drawn in each period t from a ﬁnite set Θt according to a
probability measure pi ∈ ∆(
∏
t Θt). Let Θ
t =
∏
τ≤t Θτ , and, for any sequence (bτ )τ , let
bt = (b1, . . . , bt) for each t. Before choosing an action in any period t, the agent can ac-
quire costly information about the history of states, θt. There is a ﬁxed signal space X
satisfying |A| ≤ |X| <∞.7 At time t, the agent can choose any signal about the his-
tory θt with realizations xt in X. In addition, after choosing her action in each period
t, she observes a costless signal yt from a ﬁnite set Y distributed according to a given
gt(yt | θ
t, at, yt−1) ∈ ∆(Y ); we denote by g the complete family of these distributions
across all histories (θt, at, yt−1). The signal yt incorporates all of the costless informa-
tion the agent receives. For example, yt may correspond to observation of the payoﬀ
she receives in period t, or observation of the realized state (either perfectly or with
noise in each case). One important special case—which has been the focus of the pre-
vious dynamic RI literature—is when there is no costless information, corresponding
to |Y | = 1. Let zt = (xt, yt) and Z = X×Y . We refer to z
t−1 as the decision node at t.
We assume that, for each at, yt is independent of x
t conditional on θt and yt−1;
while the agent’s choice of actions may aﬀect the distribution of yt, her choice of
information does not.
A strategy s = (f, σ) is a pair comprised of
1. an information strategy f consisting of a system of signal distributions ft(xt |
θt, zt−1), one for each θt and zt−1, with the signal xt conditionally independent
of future states θt′ for all t
′ > t, and
2. an action strategy σ consisting of a system of mappings σt : Z
t−1 × X −→ A,
where σt(z
t−1, xt) indicates the choice of action at time t for each history z
t−1
and current costly signal xt.
8
6Although the action set is constant across time, the model can implicitly allow for varying action
sets by making certain choices payoﬀ-irrelevant.
7The restriction to ﬁnite action, signal, and state spaces is technically convenient in that it allows
us to work with discrete distributions, avoiding issues of measurability, and the need to condition
on zero probability histories along the realized action path. We conjecture that Lemma 1, Theorem
1, and Proposition 3 would extend to standard continuous models.
8This formulation implicitly assumes that the agent perfectly recalls all past information. In
contrast, Woodford (2009) analyzes a model in which all information is costly, even observation of
the current time.
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Given an action strategy σ, we denote by σt(zt−1, xt) the history of actions up to time
t given the realized signals.
The agent receives ﬂow utilities ut(a
t, θt) that depend on the entire history of
actions and states, and that are uniformly bounded across all t. We refer to ut as
gross utilities to indicate that they do not include information costs. The agent
discounts payoﬀs received at time t by a factor δ(t) :=
∏t
t′=1 δt′ , where δt′ ∈ [0, 1] and
lim supt δt < 1. This form of discounting accommodates both ﬁnite and inﬁnite time
horizons.
As is standard in the RI literature, we focus throughout this paper on entropy-
based information costs. Consider a random variable W with ﬁnite support S dis-
tributed according to p ∈ ∆(S). Recall that the entropy
H(W ) = −
∑
w∈S
p(w) log p(w)
of W is a measure of uncertainty about W (with the convention that 0 log 0 = 0). At
any signal history zt−1, we assume that the cost of signal xt is proportional to the
conditional mutual information
I
(
θt; xt | z
t−1
)
= H
(
θt | zt−1
)
− Ext
[
H
(
θt | zt−1, xt
)
| zt−1
]
(1)
between xt and the history of states θ
t. The conditional mutual information captures
the diﬀerence in the agent’s uncertainty about θt before and after she receives the
signal xt. Before, her uncertainty can be measured by H (θ
t | zt−1). After, her level
of uncertainty becomes H (θt | zt−1, xt). The mutual information is the expected
reduction in uncertainty averaged across all realizations of xt.
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The agent solves the following problem.
Definition 1. The dynamic rational inattention problem (henceforth dynamic RI
problem) is
max
f,σ
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
σt(zt−1, xt), θ
t
)
− λI
(
θt; xt | z
t−1
))]
, (2)
where λ > 0 is an information cost parameter, and the expectation is taken with
9Note that I
(
θt;xt | zt−1
)
depends on the realization of zt−1. Other authors sometimes use this
notation to refer to the expectation of this quantity across zt−1.
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respect to the distribution over sequences (θt, zt)t induced by the prior pi together with
the strategy (f, σ) and the distributions g of costless signals.
To simplify notation, we normalize λ to 1. Although we assume the information
cost parameter is ﬁxed over time, one could allow for varying cost by adjusting the
discount factors and correspondingly rescaling the ﬂow utilities (as long as doing so
does not violate the restrictions on δ(t) or the uniform boundedness of the utilities).
Note that the sum in (2) converges because the gross ﬂow payoﬀs are bounded,
and the mutual information is bounded (since the signal space is ﬁnite).
One implicit assumption of our model is that the agent’s actions do not aﬀect
the distribution of future states. However, since ﬂow payoﬀs depend on the entire
histories of actions and states, any problem having this feature is equivalent to one
with larger state spaces that ﬁts within our framework. The idea is to make each
state θ˜t in the equivalent problem correspond to a vector of states in the original
problem, one for each history at−1 of actions. Payoﬀs in state θ˜t are equal to those
in the original problem for the component of θ˜t associated with a
t−1. Similarly, the
distribution of θ˜t conditional on θ˜
t−1 is constructed so as to ensure that, for each
at−1, the marginal distribution of the component associated with at−1 matches the
distribution of states in the original problem.
To make this precise, suppose for simplicity that Θt = Θ for all t, and let pit(θ |
θt−1, at−1) ∈ ∆(Θ) denote the probability of state θ in period t following the history
(θt−1, at−1). Let Θ˜t = Θ
At−1, with typical element θ˜t : A
t−1 −→ Θ, where A0 := {∅}.
An equivalent problem with state spaces Θ˜t and distributions that are independent
of actions may be obtained by taking gross utilities to be
u˜t(a
t, θ˜t) ≡ ut
(
at,
(
θ˜1(∅), . . . , θ˜t(a
t−1)
))
and the distribution of states in each period t to be
p˜it(θ˜t | θ˜
t−1) ≡
∏
at−1∈At−1
pit
(
θ˜t(a
t−1) |
(
θ˜1(∅), . . . , θ˜t−1(a
t−2)
)
, at−1
)
.
Thus following each history (θ˜t−1, at−1), for θt−1 =
(
θ˜1(∅), . . . , θ˜t−1(a
t−2)
)
, there is
probability equal to pit(θt | θ
t−1) of reaching a state θ˜t in period t satisfying θ˜t(a
t−1) =
θt, ensuring that gross payoﬀs from each action correspond to ut(a
t, θt).
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2.1 Preliminaries
Our main goal is to characterize the agent’s action choices. Let ωt = (θt, at−1, yt−1).
A (stochastic) choice rule p is a system of distributions pt (at | ω
t) over A, one for
each ωt, interpreted as the probability of choosing at at the history ω
t. We say that
a strategy s = (f, σ) generates the choice rule p if
pt
(
at | ω
t
)
≡ Pr
(
σt
(
zt−1, xt
)
= at
∣∣ θt, σt−1 (zt−2, xt−1) = at−1, yt−1),
for all at and ω
t = (θt, at−1, yt−1), where the probability is evaluated with respect to
the joint distribution of sequences of states and signals generated according to f , σ,
and g.
Conversely, a choice rule p can be associated (non-uniquely) with a strategy (f, σ).
Roughly speaking, one can choose a particular signal realization in X for each action,
and then match the probability of each of those signal realizations with the probability
the choice rule assigns to its associated action.10 If s is a strategy obtained in this
way from a choice rule p, we say that p induces s.
The following lemma simpliﬁes the analysis considerably by allowing us to focus
on a special class of information strategies in which signals correspond directly to
actions. See also Ravid (2014), who independently proved the corresponding result
in a related model with a continuum of states, and without costless signals.
Lemma 1. Any strategy s solving the dynamic RI problem generates a choice rule p
solving
max
p
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at, θt
)
− I
(
θt; at | a
t−1, yt−1
))]
, (3)
where the expectation is with respect to the distribution over sequences (θt, at, yt)t
induced by p, the prior pi, and the distributions g. Conversely, any choice rule p
solving (3) induces a strategy solving the dynamic RI problem.
Accordingly, we henceforth dispense with the signals xt, replacing them with ac-
tions at, so that zt = (at, yt), and we abuse terminology slightly by calling (3) the
dynamic RI problem, and any rule p solving (3) a solution to the dynamic RI problem.
Proofs are in the appendix.
10Formally, ﬁx any injection φ : A −→ X and, for any t, let φt denote the mapping from At to
Xt obtained by applying φ coordinate-by-coordinate. Given any choice rule p, let s = (f, σ) be such
that ft(φ(at) | θt, φt−1(at−1), yt−1) ≡ pt(at | θt, at−1, yt−1) and σ((φt−1(at−1), yt−1), φ(at)) ≡ at.
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In static models, the conclusion of Lemma 1 holds as long as the cost of signals
is nondecreasing in Blackwell informativeness and all signal structures are feasible.
To see why, consider a strategy in which two distinct signal realizations (each oc-
curring with positive probability) lead to the same action. Combining these into a
single realization has no eﬀect on the distribution of actions and (weakly) reduces the
information cost.
In dynamic problems, more structure is needed because information that is ac-
quired but not used in a given period may be used later on. For the lemma to hold,
it must be that delaying the acquisition of information until the time when it is used
never increases the information cost relative to acquiring it earlier. For example, if
the cost were a nonlinear function of the mutual information, then the agent could
have an incentive to acquire more information than what is necessary for her choice
in a given period if she plans to use that information in a later period where, given
the other information she acquires, the marginal cost of acquiring it would be higher.
When the cost is linear in mutual information and the agent (weakly) discounts the
future, the additive property of entropy ensures that delaying information acquisition
never increases the cost, regardless of other information acquired by the agent.
Lemma 1 also relies on several other assumptions of our model. The result would
not necessarily hold if |X| < |A|, or if there were restrictions on what information
strategies are feasible. For example, it fails if past states are payoﬀ-relevant but the
agent can only learn about the current state. This lemma also relies on the conditional
independence of xt and yt, for otherwise the choice of costly signal could aﬀect the
value of the free information conveyed by yt directly (as opposed to indirectly through
the choice of action).
Proposition 1. There exists a solution to the dynamic RI problem.
Proposition 1 makes use of the ﬁniteness of A, Y , and each Θt to ensure that the
strategy space is compact, and the boundedness of payoﬀs together with discounting
to ensure that the agent’s objective function is continuous in her strategy.
3 Solution
This section presents two characterizations of the solution to the dynamic RI problem—
the ﬁrst in relation to dynamic logit behavior, and the second in relation to static RI
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problems. Both characterizations rely on a reformulation of the problem as a control
problem with observable states described in Section 3.3.
3.1 Dynamic logit
Our main result states that the solution of the dynamic RI problem is a dynamic logit
rule with a bias. We begin by recalling the deﬁnition of dynamic logit for general
payoﬀs with states (θt, yt−1) in period t. We denote the payoﬀ function in period t
by vt to distinguish it from the payoﬀ function ut in the rational inattention problem
(which does not depend on yt−1). Recall that ωt = (θt, at−1, yt−1).
Definition 2 (Rust (1987)). A choice rule r is a dynamic logit rule under payoﬀs
(vt(at, ω
t))t if
rt
(
at | ω
t
)
=
exp (vˆt (at, ω
t))∑
a′
t
exp (vˆt (a′t, ω
t))
,
where
vˆt
(
at, ω
t
)
= vt
(
at, ω
t
)
+ δt+1E
[
Vt+1
(
ωt+1
)
| at, ω
t
]
,
and the continuation values Vt satisfy
Vt
(
ωt
)
= log
(∑
at
exp
(
vˆt
(
at, ω
t
)))
. (4)
The solution to the dynamic RI problem is a dynamic logit rule under payoﬀs
that are modiﬁed by an endogenous state-independent term. A default rule q is a
system of conditional action distributions qt(at | z
t−1), one for each decision node
zt−1 = (at−1, yt−1). The diﬀerence between a default rule and a choice rule is that the
latter conditions on θt while the former does not.
Given any default rule q, write u+log q to represent the system of payoﬀ functions
vt(at, θ
t, at−1, yt−1) = ut
(
at, θt
)
+ log qt
(
at | a
t−1, yt−1
)
for all t. Let V(v) = Eθ1 [V1(θ1, ∅, ∅)] denote the ﬁrst-period expected value from (4)
under the system of payoﬀ functions v = (vt)t. For any choice rule p, let pt (at | z
t−1)
denote the probability of choosing action at conditional on reaching decision node
zt−1, that is,
pt
(
at | z
t−1
)
= Eθt
[
pt
(
at | θ
t, zt−1
)
| zt−1
]
.
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We adopt the convention that log 0 = −∞ and exp(−∞) = 0.
Theorem 1. Let q be a default rule that solves
max
q˜
V(u+ log q˜).
Then the dynamic logit rule p under payoffs u+ log q solves the dynamic RI problem.
Moreover,
qt
(
at | z
t−1
)
= pt
(
at | z
t−1
)
(5)
for every decision node zt−1 that is reached with positive probability according to p
and g.
A converse to Theorem 1 also holds, with a minor caveat: for any solution p to
the dynamic RI problem, and for q satisfying (5), p coincides with the dynamic logit
rule under payoﬀs u+ log q at every ωt that is reached with positive probability.
Given a default rule q, we refer to qt(at | z
t−1) as the predisposition toward action
at at the decision node z
t−1. According to the theorem, the optimal predispositions
are identical to the average behavior at each decision node.
The log q term in the payoﬀs has a natural interpretation. To keep the discussion
simple, consider the case in which there is no costless signal yt. The agent behaves
as if she incurs a cost
ct
(
at−1, at
)
≡ − log qt
(
at | a
t−1
)
(6)
whenever she chooses at after the action history a
t−1. This endogenous virtual cost
is high when the action at is rarely chosen at a
t−1. The cost captures the cost of
information that leads to the choice of action at; actions that are unappealing ex ante
can only become appealing through costly updating of beliefs.
Theorem 1 may be relevant for identiﬁcation of preferences in dynamic logit mod-
els. Suppose that, as in Rust (1987), an econometrician observes the states θt to-
gether with the choices at, and estimates the agent’s utilities using the dynamic logit
rule from Deﬁnition 2. If our model correctly describes the agent’s behavior, then
instead of estimating the utility ut, the econometrician will in fact be estimating
ut (a
t, θt)− ct (a
t−1, at)—the utility less the virtual cost.
For a ﬁxed decision problem, separately identifying ut and ct is not necessary to
describe behavior: choice probabilities depend only on the diﬀerence ut − ct. Put
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diﬀerently, the two models provide an equally good ﬁt for the data. However, the
distinction is important when extrapolating to other decision problems (as in counter-
factual experiments). For example, Rust (1987) considers a bus company’s demand
for replacement engines. He estimates the replacement cost by ﬁtting a dynamic
logit model in which the agent trades oﬀ the replacement cost against the expected
loss from engine failure. He then obtains the expected demand by extrapolating to
diﬀerent engine prices, keeping other components of the replacement cost ﬁxed.
Our model suggests that, if costly information acquisition plays an important role,
Rust’s approach underestimates demand elasticity. Consider an increase in the engine
price. Ceteris paribus, replacement becomes less common, leading to a decrease in
the predisposition toward replacement (by (5)). This corresponds to an increase in
the virtual cost ct associated with replacement (by (6)), and hence to an additional
decrease in demand relative to the model in which ct is ﬁxed. Intuitively, the price
increase not only discourages the purchase of a new engine, it also discourages the
agent from checking whether a new engine is needed.11
Kennan and Walker (2011) estimate a dynamic model of migration decisions.
Each agent chooses a location to maximize her expected income less the cost of mov-
ing. Estimated moving costs are surprisingly large. If, as in our model, agents can
acquire costly information about wages at other locations, estimates of the moving
costs would decrease: since moves are relatively rare, the log-predisposition term in
our model creates a virtual cost of moving, which the cost identiﬁed by Kennan and
Walker (2011) combines with the true moving cost. In addition, Kennan and Walker
(2011) consider a counterfactual policy experiment involving a subsidy for moving.
In our model, the eﬀect of the subsidy would be larger than their estimates. Not
only does the subsidy have a direct eﬀect on payoﬀs, it also increases the predispo-
sition toward moving, thereby lowering the associated virtual cost; the information
acquisition induced by the subsidy reinforces the increase in migration.
Distinguishing the actual utility ut from the virtual cost ct is feasible using data
on choices and states. As described above, one can estimate ut − ct by ﬁtting the
dynamic logit rule from Deﬁnition 2. The virtual cost ct(a
t−1, at) = − log pt(at | a
t−1)
can be identiﬁed directly based on the frequency with which each action is chosen.
11Similar comments apply to other work estimating demands using dynamic logit models. For
example, Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) study demand for durable goods, while Schiraldi (2011)
focuses on automobiles.
14
3.2 Reduction to static problems
The dynamic logit characterization of Theorem 1 is related to a reduction of the
dynamic RI problem to a collection of static RI problems. This reduction allows us to
draw on well developed solution methods from the static RI literature. In particular,
we obtain a system of equations describing necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
solution of the dynamic RI problem.
As noted in the introduction, the characterization in terms of static RI problems
does not follow from the Bellman equation alone. Gross expected utilities in static
RI problems are linear in beliefs, but the continuation value function is not. For the
resulting problems to ﬁt the static RI framework, we show that one can ignore the
dependence of continuation values on beliefs and treat them simply as functions of
histories. Doing so restores the linearity of the expected gross payoﬀs and ensures
that the static problem has the usual RI structure. We explain this step in detail in
Section 3.3.
We begin with a brief description of existing results for the static case. Consider
a ﬁxed, ﬁnite action set A, a ﬁnite state space Θ, a prior pi ∈ ∆(Θ), and a payoﬀ
function u(a, θ). A static choice rule p is a collection of action distributions p(a | θ),
one for each θ ∈ Θ. We write pip(θ | a) for the posterior belief after choosing action
a given the choice rule p.12
Definition 3. The static rational inattention problem for a triple (Θ, pi, u) is
max
p
E [u(a, θ)− I(θ; a)] .
Proposition 2 (Matějka and McKay, 2015; Caplin and Dean, 2013). The static RI
problem with parameters (Θ, pi, u) is solved by the choice rule
p(a | θ) =
q(a) exp (u(a, θ))∑
a′ q(a
′) exp (u(a′, θ))
, (7)
where the default rule q ∈ ∆(A) maximizes
Epi
[
log
(∑
a
q(a) exp (u(a, θ))
)]
. (8)
12The literature on static rational inattention is richer than Deﬁnition 3 suggests. We restrict to
the deﬁnition provided here because it is suﬃcient for our characterization.
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If action a is chosen with positive probability under the rule p, then the posterior belief
after choosing a satisfies
pip(θ | a) =
pi(θ) exp (u(a, θ))∑
a′ q(a
′) exp (u(a′, θ))
. (9)
We show that the dynamic RI problem can be reduced to a collection of static RI
problems, one for each decision node zt−1. These static problems are interconnected
in that the payoﬀs and prior in one generally depend on the solutions to the others.
At each zt−1, the gross payoﬀ consists of the ﬂow payoﬀ plus a continuation value,
and the prior belief is obtained by Bayesian updating given zt−1.
We write pip(θ
t | zt−1) for the agent’s prior over θt at the decision node zt−1 given
a choice rule p, and pip(θt | zt) for the posterior over θt after zt.
We say that a dynamic choice rule is interior if, at every decision node, it chooses
each action with positive probability. For simplicity, we state here the result only for
interior dynamic choice rules. We extend the result to the general case in Proposition
7 in Appendix B.
Proposition 3. An interior dynamic choice rule p solves the dynamic RI problem if,
at each decision node zt−1 = (at−1, yt−1), pt(at | θ
t, zt−1) solves the static RI problem
with state space Θt, prior belief
pip
(
θt | zt−1
)
= pip
(
θt−1 | zt−1
)
pi
(
θt | θ
t−1
)
, (10)
and payoff function
uˆt
(
at, θ
t; zt−1
)
= ut
(
at, θt
)
+ δt+1E
[
Vt+1
(
θt+1, zt
)
| at, θ
t, zt−1
]
, (11)
where the posterior belief pip(θt | zt) satisfies Bayes’ rule with respect to the prior
pip (θ
t | zt−1), and the continuation values satisfy
Vt
(
θt, zt−1
)
= log
(∑
at
pt
(
at | z
t−1
)
exp
(
uˆt
(
at, θ
t; zt−1
)))
. (12)
As for Theorem 1, the converse to this proposition holds at all decision nodes
reached with positive probability.
Perhaps surprisingly, this result indicates that when optimizing behavior at a
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particular node, we can treat the continuation value as ﬁxed as a function of the
history. To understand the role of the continuation values, we note that the solution
can be interpreted as an equilibrium of a common interest game played by multiple
players, one for each period. The player in each period observes the history (at−1, yt−1)
but not the choice rule used in the past. In equilibrium, each player forms beliefs
according to the others’ equilibrium strategies, corresponding to the updating rule
described in the proposition. Since deviations in the choice rule are unobservable to
future players, each treats the strategies of the others (and hence the continuation
values) as ﬁxed. Even though the agent in our model can recall her own past strategy,
the proposition indicates that she can ignore the eﬀect of deviations on future beliefs.
When combined with a result from Caplin and Dean (2013), Proposition 3 provides
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for solutions to dynamic RI problems. Theorem
1 in Caplin and Dean (2013) describes necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order conditions
characterizing the solutions of static RI problems. Therefore, satisfying Caplin and
Dean’s conditions in each of the static problems in Proposition 3 is necessary and
suﬃcient for a choice rule to be a solution to the dynamic RI problem.
In ﬁnite horizon and in stationary problems, the proposition leads to a ﬁnite
system of equations characterizing the solution to the dynamic RI problem. Sections
4.2 and 4.3 illustrate this approach.
A complication arises for the characterization in Proposition 3 when the solution
of the dynamic RI problem is not interior. If the choice rule assigns zero probability
to some action at a decision node, then it is not immediately clear how to deﬁne
the posterior belief following that action. This posterior is needed to pin down the
optimal continuation play and value associated with taking the action, which in turn is
needed to determine whether taking the action with zero probability is indeed optimal.
Formula (24) in Appendix B extends the posteriors deﬁned by (9) to histories reached
with zero probability. We show in the appendix how the extended deﬁnition can be
obtained by solving the problem in which the probability of each action is constrained
to be at least some ε > 0, then taking the limit as ε→ 0.
3.3 The control problem
We now describe the key step of the proof that leads to the dynamic logit characteri-
zation and allows us to reduce the dynamic problem to a collection of static ones. The
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main idea is to establish an equivalence between the dynamic RI problem and a con-
trol problem with observable states in which the agent must pay a cost for deviating
from a default choice rule.
Reformulating the dynamic RI problem as a control problem with observable states
addresses the diﬃculty described above involving the link between the current action
distribution and the future beliefs. The control problem clariﬁes why this link can
be disregarded and hence the continuation values associated with each history can be
treated as ﬁxed when optimizing the action distribution at each decision node.
Definition 4. Given any default rule q, the control problem for q is
max
p
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at, θt
)
+ log qt
(
at | z
t−1
)
− log pt
(
at | ω
t
) )]
, (13)
where p is a stochastic choice rule, and the expectation is with respect to the joint
distribution generated by pi, p, and g.
This deﬁnition is a dynamic extension of a static control problem studied by Matts-
son and Weibull (2002). In the control problem, the agent has complete information
about the history ωt (and in particular about θt), but must trade oﬀ optimizing her
ﬂow utility ut against a control cost: for each ω
t = (θt, zt−1), she pays a cost
Ept
[
log pt
(
at | ω
t
)
− log qt
(
at | z
t−1
)
| ωt
]
for deviating from the default action distribution qt (at | z
t−1) to the action distribu-
tion pt (at | ω
t).
The next result shows that the dynamic RI problem is equivalent to the control
problem with the optimal default rule. In other words, the dynamic RI problem can
be solved by ﬁrst solving the control problem to ﬁnd the optimal choice rule p for
each default rule q, and then optimizing q.
Lemma 2. A stochastic choice rule solves the dynamic RI problem if and only if it
(together with some default rule) solves
max
q,p
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at, θt
)
+ log qt
(
at | z
t−1
)
− log pt
(
at | ω
t
) )]
, (14)
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where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution generated by pi, p, and
g.
To see how Lemma 2 addresses the diﬃculty due to the link between the current
action distribution and subsequent beliefs, note that for any ﬁxed default rule q,
optimizing the choice rule p in the control problem does not involve updating of
beliefs since the agent observes θt in period t. Since q cannot depend on the history
of states, the optimal q at each decision node zt−1 does depend on the distribution
pip(θ
t | zt−1); however, for any ﬁxed p, optimizing q does not require varying these
distributions because they are determined by p, not by q.
The proof of the lemma relies on two well-known properties of entropy:
Symmetry For any random variables X, Y , and Z, I(X ; Y | Z) = I(Y ;X | Z).
Properness For any random variable X with ﬁnite support S and distribution
p(x) ∈ ∆(S),
H(X) = − max
q∈∆(S)
Ep[log q(x)].
To interpret the latter property, consider an agent who believes that X is dis-
tributed according to p and is asked to report a distribution q ∈ ∆(S) before observ-
ing the realization of X, with the promise of a reward of log q(x) if the realized value
is x. Properness states that the truthful report q = p maximizes the expected reward.
The use of properness in the proof also relies on the information cost being pro-
portional to the reduction in entropy; the result would not hold for costs that are
nonlinear functions of the mutual information.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the symmetry of mutual information, the dynamic RI problem
is equivalent to
max
p
E
[∑
t
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at, θt
)
− I
(
at; θ
t | zt−1
))]
= max
p
E
[∑
t
δ(t)
(
ut
(
at, θt
)
−H
(
at | z
t−1
)
+H
(
at | ω
t
))]
. (15)
By properness,
E
[
−
∑
t
δ(t)H
(
at | z
t−1
) ]
= max
q
E
[∑
t
δ(t) log qt
(
at | z
t−1
) ]
.
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Substituting this into (15) and recalling that
E
[
H
(
at | ω
t
)]
= E
[
− log pt
(
at | ω
t
)]
gives the result.
The dynamic logit result in Theorem 1 follows from solving problem (14). As the
following lemma indicates, dynamic logit choice behavior (with biased payoﬀs) arises
as the solution to the control problem for any ﬁxed q. This lemma extends a result of
Mattsson and Weibull to the dynamic case: they show that, in the static version of
the control problem, the optimal action distribution is a logit rule with a bias toward
actions that are relatively likely according to the default rule.
Lemma 3. Given any default rule q, the dynamic logit rule under payoffs u + log q
solves problem (13).
4 Applications
In this section, we apply our results in three examples. The ﬁrst illustrates the
mechanics of the model in a particularly simple setting. The second shows how
allowing for unrestricted information choice can generate a simpler solution than one
would obtain with exogenous information or standard restricted classes of signals.
The last example demonstrates that Proposition 3 can be useful in problems with a
constraint on information acquisition in each period instead of a cost.
4.1 Status quo bias
Our ﬁrst application uses a particularly simple instance of our model to illustrate in-
tertemporal incentives to acquire information. In doing so, we show that the dynamics
of choice by a rationally inattentive agent may resemble status-quo-bias behavior (see,
e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)). The agent chooses an action at ∈ {0, 1} at
t = 1, 2. The gross ﬂow payoﬀ ut is 1 if at = θt, and is 0 otherwise. There is no dis-
counting. The states are symmetrically distributed and positively correlated across
time in the following way: θ1 is equally likely to be 0 or 1, and, whatever the realized
value of θ1, the probability that θ2 6= θ1 is γ < 1/2. The agent receives no costless
signal.
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This example can be interpreted as a stylized model of investment in a risky asset.
The agent prefers to invest (corresponding to at = 1) if and only if the return from
the asset exceeds the risk-free rate (corresponding to θt = 1). Learning about the
quality of the asset is costly, as is monitoring its performance.
We analyze the correlation between actions across the two periods. If the agent
chooses not to acquire any information in the second period, then her behavior ex-
hibits an apparent status quo bias insofar as she never reverses her decision, even if
the state changes; an outside observer who sees the realized states and the agent’s
actions might conclude that she has a preference for maintaining the same choice.
The following proposition shows that the optimal strategy has this feature whenever
the serial correlation in the state is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 4. There exists γ∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that, under the optimal choice rule,
Pr(a2 = a1) = 1 whenever γ < γ
∗.
The proposition holds for γ∗ ≈ 0.16; thus if the probability that the state changes
is less than 0.16 then the agent acquires information only in the ﬁrst period, and
relies on that information in both periods. Since the state may change in between
the periods, the agent performs better in the ﬁrst period than in the second (in the
sense that her action is more likely to match the state).
The superior performance in the ﬁrst period illustrates the importance of the
endogenous timing of information acquisition in our model. In a variant of the model
with exogenous conditionally i.i.d. signals, the agent would perform better in the
second period than in the ﬁrst since she obtains more precise information about θ2
than about θ1. When information is endogenous, the correlation between the two
periods creates an incentive to acquire more information in the ﬁrst period because
that information can be used twice.
However, correlation does not generate the status quo bias on its own—the tem-
poral structure also plays an important role in the sense that the eﬀect would not
arise if the agent could acquire information about both states in the ﬁrst period. To
see this, consider a static variant in which the agent simultaneously chooses a pair of
actions (a1, a2) to maximize
E
[
u1(a1, θ1) + u2(a2, θ2)− I
(
(θ1, θ2); (a1, a2)
)]
.
In this case, as in the original example, the optimal strategy involves a single binary
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signal and identical actions in the two periods if γ is suﬃciently small. In the static
variant, however, the expected performance is constant across the two periods. The
asymmetric performance in the original example arises because it is impossible for
the agent to learn directly about the second period in the ﬁrst, when information is
most valuable.
Finally, to illustrate the role of correlation in the state across periods, consider a
benchmark in which θ1 and θ2 are independent and uniform on {0, 1}. In that case,
any information obtained in the ﬁrst period is useless in the second. The problem
therefore reduces to a pair of unconnected static RI problems (one for each period).
The solution involves switching actions with probability 1/2 and constant performance
across the two periods.
Although the solution when the states are correlated may appear as if the agent
has a preference against switching her action, the independent case highlights the
diﬀerence between such a preference and the eﬀect of information acquisition; if the
“status quo bias” behavior were driven by preferences, it would not depend on corre-
lation between the states.
4.2 Inertia
Our second application consists of a stationary inﬁnite-horizon environment in which
the state follows a Markov chain and the agent chooses an action in each period with
the goal of matching the state. This example can be viewed as a stylized model of a
wide range of economic phenomena. The action could represent a consumer’s choice
of what product to purchase, an investor’s choice of whether to hold a particular
asset, or a worker’s choice of whether to participate in the labor market. We start
by analyzing a model in which all information acquired by the agent is costly. For
example, in product choice, one can think of the state as capturing which product
oﬀers a larger surplus, which is costly to monitor.
Comparative statics of adjustment patterns with respect to the stochastic prop-
erties of the agent’s environment are a central question in the RI literature. Existing
studies, such as Sims (2003), Moscarini (2004), Luo (2008), and Maćkowiak and
Wiederholt (2009), provide results for quadratic payoﬀs and normally distributed
shocks. Our framework provides an alternative approach suitable for general payoﬀs
and distributions in discrete environments.
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The agent chooses an action at ∈ {0, 1} in each period t ∈ N. The state θt follows
a Markov chain on {0, 1} with time-homogeneous transition probabilities γ(θ, θ′) from
θ to θ′. In each period t, the gross ﬂow payoﬀ u(at, θt) is ua > 0 if at = θt = a, and 0
if at 6= θt. Payoﬀs are discounted exponentially with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The
agent receives no costless signal.
In contrast to the analogous model with exogenous information, behavior in this
framework is Markovian: the choice rule, continuation values, and predispositions
in any period t depend on the last action at−1 and the current state θt, but not on
any earlier actions or states. Moreover, after a ﬁnite number of periods, the choice
rule is stationary. This implies that the long-run behavior is characterized by a
ﬁnite set of equations, making it amenable to numerical computation. This Markov
property of the solution holds for arbitrary ﬁnite sets of actions and states, general
time-homogeneous Markov processes, and general utilities as long as all actions are
chosen with positive probability at all decision nodes.13 This feature highlights the
relative simplicity of the rationally inattentive solution compared to that of similar
decision problems with exogenous conditionally i.i.d. signals. In the exogenous case,
the optimal strategy is not Markov: actions depend on the entire history of signals, the
probabilities of which in turn depend on the entire history of states. Characterizing
the distribution of actions is therefore complicated even in the simplest cases.
The Markov property of the solution follows from Proposition 3 together with a
result of Caplin and Dean (2013). They show that in static RI problems, the set of
posterior beliefs that arises from the optimal choice of signal is constant across priors
lying within its convex hull. By Proposition 3, the same result holds in dynamic
problems. In the present setting, it follows that the agent’s posterior after choosing
at is independent of her prior at the beginning of period t whenever she acquires a
nontrivial signal. In particular, this posterior is independent of at−1.
Given an optimal choice rule p, we denote by pˆ(at | θt, at−1) the long-run stationary
choice rule; thus pˆ(at | θt, at−1) ≡ pt(at | θ
t, at−1) for suﬃciently large t.
We say that a solution is eventually interior if there exists t′ such that, for every
t > t′, each action is chosen with positive probability at each at−1. Lemma 6 in the
appendix translates Proposition 3 to characterize the long-run solution in the present
13The structure of our solution resembles that of the bounded memory model of Wilson (2014).
Each action in our model can be viewed as a “memory state,” with the agent’s strategy describing
stochastic transitions among them. As in Wilson’s model, beliefs in each memory state depend on
the agent’s entire strategy.
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setting in terms of a system of equations, provided that it is eventually interior. One
can check whether this is the case by solving the system of equations in the lemma.
If all of the resulting predispositions lie in (0, 1) then there is indeed an eventually
interior solution.
The next result shows that the model generates intuitive comparative statics.14
We say that the states θt have positive persistence if γ(0, 0) + γ(1, 1) > 1; similarly,
actions at eventually have positive persistence if Pr(at = 0 | at−1 = 0) + Pr(at = 1 |
at−1 = 1) > 1 for all t suﬃciently large. Positive persistence captures inertia in the
process: it says that the state one period earlier is more likely to be the same as the
current state than diﬀerent.
Proposition 5. Suppose states have positive persistence and the solution is eventually
interior. Then
1. actions eventually have positive persistence, and moreover, the choice rule sat-
isfies pˆ(at | θt, at−1) > pˆ(at | θt, a
′
t−1) whenever at = at−1 6= a
′
t−1; and
2. the posterior probability pip(θt = a | at = a
′) is nonincreasing in the payoff ua
for all a, a′ ∈ {0, 1} and all t.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition says that inertia in the state will be reﬂected by
inertia in behavior. The second part says that if ua increases, the agent adjusts her
information in such a way that her degree of certainty when choosing a falls, while
her degree of certainty when choosing the other action rises. Both results follow from
analyzing the system of equations described in Lemma 6.
We now extend the model to allow for the agent to receive costless signals—in
the form of observation of ﬂow payoﬀs—at the end of each period. How does the
provision of free information aﬀect choice behavior? We show that costless signals
crowd out information acquisition. In some cases, the crowding-out eﬀect is so strong
that the agent is less likely to choose the optimal action with costless signals than
without them. This result implies that providing free information can lower the
agent’s gross payoﬀs. Her net payoﬀs, however, cannot decrease: whatever loss she
incurs from choosing suboptimal actions is compensated by a lower cost of information
acquisition.
14Additional comparative statics results may be found in an earlier version of this paper (Steiner,
Stewart, and Matějka, 2015).
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As a benchmark, consider a static RI problem (Θ, pi, u) with solution p. Suppose
the agent, before acquiring information, receives a costless signal, y. We focus on the
case in which y is less informative than the signal the agent acquires in the original
problem; that is, we suppose that for each realization of y, the belief pi(θ | y) lies in
the convex hull of the posteriors arising from p.15 Upon observing y, the agent solves
the static RI problem (Θ, pi(· | y), u). We denote the optimal choice after observing
y by p˜(a | θ, y). We are interested in the distribution of the agent’s actions in each
state; accordingly, deﬁne the average choice rule p˜(a | θ) :=
∑
y pi(y | θ)p˜(a | θ, y).
In this case, the average choice rule p˜(a | θ) is identical to p(a | θ); whether or
not the agent receives free information has no eﬀect on her behavior in each state.
This observation follows from the result in Caplin and Dean (2013) that the optimal
posteriors in static RI problems are the same across all priors within their convex hull:
since the prior belief and the sets of posteriors are the same in the two problems, so
is the distribution of actions in each state.
In dynamic decision problems, provision of free information has an additional
eﬀect. In choosing what information to acquire, the agent must consider its value not
only in the current period but also in the future. If the agent did not expect to receive
costless signals in future periods, the eﬀect of a (not-too-strong) costless signal before
the current period would be to exactly crowd out information acquisition, as in the
static case. However, receiving additional signals in the future tends to lower the
value of acquiring information today, leading to a reduction in the overall precision
of information in each period.
To illustrate, suppose the realized payoﬀ given at and θt is stochastic. More
speciﬁcally, if at = θt, the agent receives—and freely observes—a ﬂow payoﬀ of
1
2λ−1
with probability λ and of 0 with probability 1− λ, where λ ∈ (1/2, 1]. If at 6= θt, the
agent receives a ﬂow payoﬀ of 1
2λ−1
with probability 1 − λ and of 0 with probability
λ. Flow payoﬀs are independent across periods conditional on the history of states.
Let u(at, θt) denote the expected ﬂow payoﬀ given (at, θt), and note that, for every λ,
the payoﬀ diﬀerence u(θ, θ)− u(1− θ, θ) is 1 for each θ.
Higher values of λ correspond to more precise costless signals. When λ = 1, the
ﬂow payoﬀ perfectly reveals the state θt at the end of each period. In this case, con-
tinuation values are independent of the current action. The agent therefore acquires
the same signal as if the choice for the current period were a static problem. At the
15Whenever pi(θ | y) lies outside this convex hull, the agent acquires no additional information.
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Figure 1: Precision, pi(λ), as a function of the informativeness of ﬂow payoﬀs for
discount factor δ = 0.9 and transition probabilities γ(0, 1) = γ(1, 0) = 0.9.
other extreme, for λ close to 1/2, this model approximates the one with no costless
signal.
Suppose γ(0, 1) = γ(1, 0). Symmetry implies that the solution is characterized by
a precision pi(λ) ∈ (1/2, 1) such that, in every period t for which the agent’s prior
belief that θt = 0 lies in [1−pi(λ), pi(λ)], her posterior after observing xt is either pi(λ)
or 1− pi(λ).
From the characterization in Proposition 3, it follows that the optimal precision
is the value of pi that maximizes
pi +H(pi)− δEy [H (pip (pi, y))] , (16)
where pip (pi, y) denotes the prior belief assigned to a given state in period t + 1 if pi
is the belief in period t at the time the action is chosen, and the agent receives ﬂow
payoﬀ y in period t. The ﬁrst term in (16) captures the impact of pi on the expected
gross payoﬀ in period t. The second term captures the impact on the information
cost in period t. The third term captures the impact of the belief in period t on the
information cost in period t + 1 through its eﬀect on the prior belief in the latter
period.
Figure 1 depicts the optimal precision, obtained by maximizing (16) numerically.
Precision decreases in the informativeness of the ﬂow payoﬀs. Since the precision is
equal to the probability that the agent’s action matches the state in each period, the
agent’s gross payoﬀ also decreases with λ.
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4.3 Response times
A large body of research in psychology—and more recently in economics—has exam-
ined response times in decision-making (e.g., see Rubinstein, 2007). An important
methodological question in this area is whether choice procedures should be modeled
explicitly or in reduced form. Sims (2003) argues that the RI framework is a promis-
ing tool for incorporating response times into traditional economic models that treat
decision-making as a black box. Our model, with its focus on sequential choice, is a
step in this direction. Woodford (2014) studies delayed decisions in an RI model that
focuses on neurological decision procedures.16
We focus on the following simple model. The state θ ∈ {0, 1} is uniformly dis-
tributed and ﬁxed over time. In each period t = 1, . . . , T , the agent chooses a terminal
action 0 or 1, or waiting (denoted by w). She receives a beneﬁt of 1 if her terminal
action matches the state, and 0 otherwise. In addition, she incurs a cost c ∈ (0, 1) for
each period that she waits. Letting wt = (w, . . . , w) (t times), the agent’s total gross
payoﬀ is the undiscounted sum of the ﬂow payoﬀs
ut(a
t, θ) =


1 if at = (wt−1, θ),
0 if at = (wt−1, 1− θ),
−c if at = wt,
0 otherwise.
This formulation is similar to the model of Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949)
except that information is endogenous; see also Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki
(2015).
With the information cost function as in our general model, the solution to this
problem is trivial: since delay is costly, any strategy that involves delayed decisions
is dominated by a strategy that generates the same distribution of terminal actions
in the ﬁrst period. However, some delay is optimal in a closely related variation of
the model in which—as in much of the RI literature—there is an upper bound on
how much information the agent can process in a given amount of time; thus delaying
allows her to process more information. We view this formulation as natural for
capturing perceptual experiments that take place over a short time. Accordingly, the
16See Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2014) for a review of psychological and economic research on
decision times, and of the methodological diﬀerences between the two ﬁelds.
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agent solves
max
f,σ
E
[ T∑
t=1
ut
(
σt(xt), θ
) ]
, (17)
s.t. I
(
θ; xt | x
t−1
)
≤ κ for all xt−1 and t = 1, . . . , T,
where κ > 0 is the capacity constraint on the information acquired per period, f =
(f(xt | x
t−1))t is the information strategy, and σ = (σt(x
t))t is the action strategy.
We assume that there are at least four signal realizations (i.e., |X| ≥ 4), and that
κT < log 2, which means that the capacity is not large enough for the agent to learn
the state perfectly within the T periods.
Given a strategy for the agent, let rt = Pr (at 6= w | a
t−1 = wt−1) and gt = Pr(at =
θ | at−1 = wt−1 and at 6= w). We refer to rt as the (hazard) rate and gt as the accuracy
of terminal actions at time t.
Proposition 6. For each κ, there exist c and c with c > c > 0 such that if c ∈ (c, c),
then (17) has a solution in which the rate rt is positive and constant across t < T ,
rT = 1, and gt =
exp(κ/c)
1+exp(κ/c)
for every t.
This result indicates that the solution involves constant accuracy across periods,
and a constant rate until the ﬁnal period (at which point taking a terminal action
is always optimal). This solution reﬂects two tradeoﬀs. First, for given rates rt, the
agent can trade oﬀ accuracy across periods: decreasing accuracy in one period frees
up capacity that can be used to acquire information that improves the accuracy of
future decisions. The marginal value of capacity must be equalized across periods,
which occurs when accuracy is constant. The second tradeoﬀ is between speed and
accuracy. Increasing the rate of terminal actions lowers the expected waiting cost
but requires a corresponding decrease in accuracy so as not to violate the capacity
constraint. The optimal accuracy therefore depends on both the capacity, κ, and the
waiting cost, c.
Although problem (17) does not ﬁt directly into our general model, we show in
the proof of Proposition 6 that it can be solved by transforming it into a problem
that does. We ﬁrst consider a relaxed problem in which capacity is storable; the
agent therefore faces a cumulative capacity constraint at each decision node. Because
of the additivity of mutual information, the behavior in any solution to this relaxed
problem can be replicated in the original problem (although the timing of information
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acquisition may diﬀer). The Lagrangian for this relaxed problem is a special case of
the objective function in our general model; accordingly, we ﬁnd the solution using
Proposition 3.
Unlike our general model, problem (17) cannot be solved by a strategy in which
signal realizations map one-to-one to actions (as in Lemma 1): with constant accuracy
and binding constraints, the only way to achieve a higher rate in the ﬁnal period
is to acquire information even when choosing to wait. With four possible signal
realizations, an optimal strategy has two realizations leading to posteriors gt and
1 − gt—at which the agent chooses a terminal action—and two realizations leading
to posteriors closer to 1/2, at which the agent waits. Lemma 1 does hold in the
relaxed problem with storable capacity; in that problem, any information obtained
while waiting can be delayed until it is used for a terminal decision.
How do response times vary with the capacity κ? Higher values of κ can be
interpreted as describing an agent with higher ability, or a decision problem that
is easier to solve. Given the solution in Proposition 6 together with the fact that
the constraints in (17) bind, one can compute the rate rt numerically. We ﬁnd that
the rate is not monotone in the capacity: decisions are fastest when the capacity is
high or low, and slowest for intermediate capacities. If the capacity is low, there is
little incentive to delay the decision since the cost of delay is large relative to the
value of the additional information that can be acquired. If the capacity is high, the
agent can acquire precise information quickly and then has little incentive to delay
in order to acquire additional information. If individual subjects can be treated as
having a ﬁxed capacity across problems in an experiment, this suggests that we should
expect signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the correlation between accuracy and decision times
depending on whether the data is within or across subjects.
5 Summary
We solve a general dynamic decision problem in which an agent repeatedly ac-
quires information, facing entropy-based information costs. The optimal behavior is
stochastic—the action distribution at each decision node complies with a logit choice
rule—and biased—compared to the standard dynamic logit model, the agent behaves
as if she incurs a cost for choosing actions that are unlikely ex ante. When incentives
are serially correlated, the agent exhibits an endogenous conservative bias that results
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in stickiness in her actions. The distinction between real and informational frictions
is a central topic of the RI literature that has been studied in particular settings. This
paper formalizes, in a general setting, an equivalence between the two frictions within
any given decision problem, while showing that they lead to distinct predictions when
extrapolating to diﬀerent problems.
As a tool for solving the problem, we show that the RI model with incomplete
information and learning is behaviorally equivalent to a complete information control
problem. The agent behaves as if she faces a cost of deviating from a default choice
rule, but also engages in a second layer of optimization: at the ex ante stage, she
optimizes the default rule, which is independent of the state of the world, and ex post,
the agent chooses an optimal deviation from the default rule given the incentives in
the realized state and the control cost.
Appendix
A Proofs for Section 2.1
The next two lemmas are used to prove Lemma 1. The ﬁrst relies on the conditional
independence of xt and yt, the additive property of entropy, and the symmetry of
mutual information.
Lemma 4. Let at = σt(zt−1, xt). The total discounted information cost associated
with any strategy (f, σ) satisfies
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)I(θt; xt | z
t−1)
]
= E
[
∞∑
t=1
((
−δ(t) + δ(t+1)
)
H(θt | xt, yt)− δ(t)H(yt | x
t, yt−1)
+δ(t)H(yt | θ
t, at, yt−1) + δ(t)H(θt | θ
t−1)
) ]
. (18)
30
Proof. Recall that
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)I(θt; xt | z
t−1)
]
= E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
H(θt | xt−1, yt−1)−H(θt | xt, yt−1)
)]
.
(19)
By the symmetry of mutual information, for at = σt(zt−1, xt),
E
[
H(θt | xt, yt−1)−H(θt | xt, yt)
]
= E
[
I(θt; yt | x
t, yt−1)
]
= E
[
I(yt; θ
t | xt, yt−1)
]
= E
[
H(yt | x
t, yt−1)−H(yt | θ
t, xt, yt−1)
]
= E
[
H(yt | x
t, yt−1)−H(yt | θ
t, at, yt−1)
]
,
where the last step follows from the independence of xt and yt conditional on (θ
t, yt−1, at).
In addition, by the additive property of entropy and the independence of θt and
(xt−1, yt−1) conditional on θt−1,
E
[
H(θt | xt−1, yt−1)
]
= E
[
H(θt−1 | xt−1, yt−1) +H(θt | θ
t−1, xt−1, yt−1)
]
= E
[
H(θt−1 | xt−1, yt−1) +H(θt | θ
t−1)
]
.
Substituting the last two identities into the right-hand side of (19) gives
E
[
∞∑
t=1
δ(t)
(
H(θt−1 | xt−1, yt−1)−H(θt | xt, yt)−H(yt | x
t, yt−1)
+H(yt | θ
t, at, yt−1) +H(θt | θ
t−1)
) ]
.
Rearranging terms gives the result.
Lemma 5. Let χ, ξ, and ζ be finite random variables such that ζ is measurable with
respect to ξ. Then E[H(χ | ξ)] ≤ E[H(χ | ζ)].
Proof. Since ζ is measurable with respect to ξ, Pr(χ | ζ) ≡
∑
ξ Pr(χ | ξ) Pr(ξ | ζ).
Thus Pr(χ | ζ) is a convex combination of the distributions Pr(χ | ξ) (as ξ varies).
The result follows from the concavity of entropy.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let s be a strategy and p the choice rule generated by s. By
construction, s and p give the same stream of expected gross payoﬀs. We claim that
31
the information cost
E
[
∞∑
t=1
I(θt; at | a
t−1, yt−1)
]
associated with p is no larger than that associated with s, which, by Lemma 4, is equal
to the right-hand side of (18). The information cost associated with p can be expressed
in the exactly same way except with at in place of each xt. These two expressions can
be compared term-by-term. By Lemma 5, E [H(θt | xt, yt)] ≤ E [H(θt | at, yt)] and
E [H(yt | x
t, yt−1)] ≤ E [H(yt | a
t, yt−1)] for every t. Since δ(t+1) ≤ δ(t), this implies
that the ﬁrst two terms of the sum on the right-hand of (18) are at least as large as
the corresponding terms in the expression associated with p. Since the last two terms
of the sum are identical in the two cases, the claim follows.
We have shown that the discounted expected payoﬀ from any strategy s is no larger
than the value of the objective function in (3) given the choice rule generated by s.
Conversely, the discounted expected payoﬀ from any strategy induced by a choice
rule p is identical to the value of the objective function in (3) given p. Together, these
two relationships imply the result.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the space of strategies Π =
∏
t∆(A)
Θt×At−1×Y t−1 .
By Tychonoﬀ’s Theorem, the space Π is compact in the product topology, and because
ut is uniformly bounded, the objective function is continuous. Therefore, an optimum
exists.
B Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3. Given q, let vt(at, ω
t) = ut(a
t, θt) + log qt(at | a
t−1, yt−1) for all
ωt = (θt, at−1, yt−1). For each ωt such that Pr(ωt) > 0 (where the probability is with
respect to pi, q, and g), let
Vt(ω
t) =
1
δ(t)
max
{pτ (·|ωτ )}
∞
τ=t
E
[
∞∑
τ=t
δ(τ)
(
vτ (aτ , ω
τ)− log pτ (aτ | ω
τ)
)
| ωt
]
;
thus Vt(ω
t) is the continuation value in the control problem for q. If Pr(ωt) = 0, we
deﬁne Vt(ω
t) arbitrarily.
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When Pr(ωt) > 0, the value Vt satisﬁes the recursion
Vt(ω
t) = max
pt(·|ωt)
E
[
vt(at, ω
t)− log pt(at | ω
t) + δt+1Vt+1(ω
t+1) | ωt
]
(20)
(recall that δt+1 = δ
(t+1)/δ(t)).
To solve the maximization problem in (20), note ﬁrst that, since vt(at, ω
t) =
ut(a
t, θt) + log qt(at | z
t−1) (for zt−1 = (at−1, yt−1)), if qt(at | z
t−1) = 0—and hence
log qt(at | z
t−1) = −∞—for some at, then we must have pt (at | (θ
t−1, θt), z
t−1) =
0 for every θt satisfying pi(θ
t−1, θt) > 0.
17 Accordingly, let A(zt−1) = {at ∈ A :
qt(at | z
t−1) > 0}, and suppose at ∈ A(z
t−1) and pi(θt−1, θt) > 0. If A(z
t−1) is a
singleton, then pt (at | (θ
t−1, θt), z
t−1) = 1. Otherwise, the ﬁrst-order condition for
the optimization problem in (20) with respect to pt(at | ω
t) is
vt(at, ω
t)−
(
log pt(at | ω
t) + 1
)
+ δt+1E
[
Vt+1
(
ωt+1
)
| ωt, at
]
= µt(ω
t), (21)
where µt(ω
t) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
∑
a′
t
pt(a
′
t |
ωt) = 1.
Rearranging the ﬁrst-order condition gives
pt(at | ω
t) = exp
(
vt(at, ω
t)− 1 + δt+1V t+1
(
at, ω
t
)
− µt(ω
t)
)
,
where V t+1 (at, ω
t) := E [Vt+1 (ω
t+1) | ωt, at]. Since
∑
a′
t
∈A(zt−1) pt(a
′
t | ω
t) = 1, it
follows that
pt(at | ω
t) =
exp
(
vt(at, ω
t)− 1 + δt+1V t+1 (at, ω
t)− µt(ω
t)
)
∑
a′
t
∈A(zt−1) exp
(
vt(a′t, ω
t)− 1 + δt+1V t+1 (a′t, ω
t)− µt(ωt)
)
=
exp
(
vt(at, ω
t) + δt+1V t+1 (at, ω
t)
)
∑
a′
t
∈A(zt−1) exp
(
vt(a′t, ω
t) + δt+1V t+1 (a′t, ω
t)
) .
17If pi(θt−1, θt) = 0 then pt
(
at | (θt−1, θt), zt−1
)
has no eﬀect on the value and can be chosen
arbitrarily.
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Substituting into (20) gives the recursion
V t(at−1, ω
t−1) = E
[
− δt+1V t+1(at, ω
t)
+ log

 ∑
a′
t
∈A(zt−1)
exp
(
vt(a
′
t, ω
t) + δt+1V t+1(a
′
t, ω
t)
)+ δt+1V t+1(at, ωt)
∣∣∣∣ωt−1, at−1
]
,
and therefore,
V t(at−1, ω
t−1)
= E

log

 ∑
a′
t
∈A(zt−1)
exp
(
vt(a
′
t, ω
t) + δt+1V t+1(a
′
t, ω
t)
) ∣∣∣∣ ωt−1, at−1


= E

log

∑
a′
t
∈A
q(a′t|z
t−1) exp
(
ut((a
t−1, a′t), θ
t) + δt+1V t+1(a
′
t, ω
t)
) ∣∣∣∣ ωt−1, at−1

 ,
as needed.
Proof of Theorem 1. The ﬁrst assertion follows immediately from Lemmas 2 and 3.
For the second assertion, ﬁxing p, if zt−1 is reached with positive probability, proper-
ness implies that qt(at | z
t−1) = pt(at | z
t−1) maximizes the objective in problem
(14).
Proof of Proposition 3. Given zt−1 and continuation values Vt+1(ω
t+1), we refer to the
static problem described in the proposition as the static RI problem at zt−1. Each
of these static problems is a special case of our general model; in particular, Lemma
2 implies that pt(at | θ
t, zt−1) solves the static RI problem at zt−1 if and only if it,
together with some qt(· | z
t−1) solves the corresponding control problem
max
qt(·|zt−1),{pt(·|θt,zt−1)}θt
E
[
uˆt
(
at, θ
t; zt−1
)
+ log qt
(
at | z
t−1
)
− log pt
(
at | θ
t, zt−1
)
| zt−1
]
,
(22)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution of at, θ
t, and yt gen-
erated by the prior pip(θ
t | zt−1) together with {pt(· | θ
t, zt−1)}θt . We call (22) the
control problem at zt−1.
By Lemma 2, it suﬃces to prove that any solution of the control problem (problem
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(14)) coincides at every zt−1 with a solution of the control problem at zt−1. By Lemma
3, for any given q, the objective function in (14) is maximized by p satisfying
pt(at | θ
t, zt−1) =
qt(at | z
t−1) exp (uˆ(at, θ
t; zt−1))∑
a′
t
qt(a
′
t | z
t−1) exp (uˆ(a′t, θ
t; zt−1))
. (23)
Similarly, for each zt−1, given qt(· | z
t−1), this pt maximizes the objective function in
the control problem at zt−1.
Let q be a solution to (14) (together with p given by (23)). Since p is interior,
it follows from (23) that pt(at | ω
t) > 0 for every ωt. The result now follows from
the Principle of Optimality: the control problem at zt−1 corresponds to the Bellman
equation at that decision node, and hence qt(· | z
t−1) and pt(· | θ
t, zt−1) also solve the
control problem at zt−1 (and conversely).
We now extend Proposition 3 to cases in which the solution to the dynamic RI
problem is not interior. To do this, we must ensure that prior beliefs in the static
problems are deﬁned appropriately to generate the correct continuation values. We
deﬁne the posterior belief in a static RI problem after an action a is taken with zero
probability to be
pip(θ | a) =
1∑
θ′ pi(θ
′) expu(a,θ
′)∑
a′
q(a′) exp u(a′,θ′)
pi(θ) exp u(a, θ)∑
a′ q(a
′) exp u(a′, θ)
. (24)
This expression coincides with (9) when a is chosen with positive probability. Other-
wise, it diﬀers from (9) only by a renormalization. The main idea of the proof is to
add an additional constraint placing a lower bound on every qt(at | z
t−1) in both the
original control problem and the control problem at zt−1, and then examine the limit
as this lower bound vanishes. The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3
applies to the problems with the lower bound, and continuity yields the desired result
in the limit.
Proposition 7. There exists a dynamic choice rule p solving the dynamic RI problem
such that, at each decision node zt−1, pt(at | θ
t, zt−1) solves the static RI problem with
state space Θt, prior belief pip(θ
t | zt−1) satisfying (10), and payoff function uˆt given
by (11), where the posterior belief pip(θt | at, z
t−1) formed after taking action at at the
decision node zt−1 complies with (24), and the continuation values satisfy (12).
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Proof. Consider, for ε ∈ (0, 1/|A|), the ε-control problem, which is identical to the
original control problem (problem (14)) except that for each at and z
t−1, there is a
constraint that qt(at | z
t−1) ≥ ε. Deﬁne the ε-control problem at zt−1 analogously.
The argument in the proof of Proposition 3 applies here to show that, for each ε, the
solutions to the ε-control problem coincide with those of the full collection of ε-control
problems at decision nodes zt−1. Moreover, essentially the same argument as in the
proof of Proposition 1 establishes that a solution to each ε-control problem exists.
By Lemma 3, the solution to (and value of) the control problem for q is contin-
uous in q (with respect to the product topology). Therefore, any limit point—as ε
vanishes—of the set of solutions to the ε-control problem is a solution to the original
control problem. An analogous argument applies to the ε-control problem at each
zt−1 provided that the continuation values and priors approach those described in the
proposition as ε vanishes.
For each ωt = (θt, at−1, yt−1) and ε, let V εt (ω
t) denote the continuation value in the
ε-control problem. Consider the ε-control problem at zt−1 = (at−1, yt−1), and write
pip for the prior and uˆ
ε
t for the analogue of uˆt with continuation values V
ε
t in place of
Vt. We have
V εt (ω
t) = log
(∑
at
qt(at | z
t−1) exp(uˆεt(at, ω
t))
)
,
which converges to the expression in (12) since pt(at | z
t−1) = qt(at | z
t−1) at an
optimum.
For the priors, note that the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to qt(at | z
t−1) for
a solution of the ε-control problem at zt−1 with qt(at | z
t−1) ∈ (ε, 1) is
∑
θt
pip(θ
t) exp uˆε(at, ω
t)∑
a′
t
qt(a′t | z
t−1) exp uˆε(a′t, ω
t)
= µ, (25)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
∑
a′
t
qt(a
′
t | z
t−1) = 1.
Note that there must exist some at for which qt(at | z
t−1) ∈ (ε, 1). For this action at,
we have pt(at | z
t−1) = qt(at | z
t−1), and hence the left-hand side of (25) is the sum
of posterior beliefs, which must be equal to 1.
Now consider at for which the solution is qt(at | z
t−1) = ε (if such an at exists).
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Then we must have
∑
θt
pip(θ
t) exp uˆε(at, ω
t)∑
a′
t
qt(a′t | z
t−1) exp uˆε(a′t, ω
t)
≤ µ = 1.
In this case, the posterior beliefs satisfy
pip(θt | at, z
t−1) =
pip(θ
t)
pt(at | z
t−1)
pt(at | ω
t)
=
qt(at | z
t−1)
pt(at | z
t−1)
pip(θ
t) exp(uˆε(at, ω
t))∑
a′
t
qt(a′t | z
t−1) exp(uˆε(a′t, ω
t))
=
1∑
θ˜t pip(θ˜
t) exp(uˆε(at,ω
t))∑
a′
t
qt(a′t|z
t−1) exp(uˆε(a′t,ω˜
t))
pip(θ
t) exp(uˆε(at, ω
t))∑
a′
t
qt(a
′
t | z
t−1) exp(uˆε(a
′
t, ω
t))
,
where ω˜t = (θ˜t, at−1, yt−1). Therefore, as ε vanishes, the posteriors indeed approach
those given by (24).
C Proofs and computations for Section 4
C.1 Status quo bias
Proof of Proposition 4. By symmetry, the predispositions in the ﬁrst period are given
by q1(0) = q1(1) = 1/2, and in the second period, q2(0 | 0) = q2(1 | 1). Denote the
latter by s. Also by symmetry, the continuation value function attains only two
values:
V2
(
a1, θ
2
)
=

Vc if a1 = θ2,Vw if a1 6= θ2,
where Vc is the expected payoﬀ in period 2 (including the information cost) when
a1 = θ2, and Vw is the corresponding payoﬀ when a1 6= θ2. By Theorem 1 and (4),
the continuation values satisfy Vw = log(s+ (1− s)e) and Vc = log(se+ (1− s)).
Applying Theorem 1 and (4) together with symmetry in the ﬁrst period gives the
expected payoﬀ
log
(
1
2
exp (1 + (1− γ)Vc + γVw) +
1
2
exp ((1− γ)Vw + γVc)
)
,
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where the predisposition s maximizes this expression (subject to 0 ≤ s ≤ 1). This is
equivalent to maximizing
W (s; γ) := exp (1 + (1− γ)Vc + γVw) + exp ((1− γ)Vw + γVc)
= e(se+ (1− s))1−γ(s+ (1− s)e)γ + (s+ (1− s)e)1−γ(se + (1− s))γ.
Note that, because γ ∈ (0, 1/2), W (s; γ) ≥ W (1 − s; γ) for s > 1/2, and thus the
maximand is at least 1/2.
It is straightforward to verify that W (s; γ) is concave in s, and its derivative (with
respect to s) at s = 1 is positive when γ = 0. It follows that the optimal value of s is
1 when γ = 0, and therefore, by continuity, there exists γ∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that this
is true whenever γ < γ∗.
C.2 Inertia
Lemma 6. Suppose there is an eventually interior solution. Then there exists t′
such that for t > t′, conditional on at−1 and θt, at is independent of θ
t−1 and at−2.
Moreover, there is an optimal choice rule for which pt(at | θ
t, at−1) ≡ pˆ(at | θt, at−1)
in each period t > t′, where
pˆ(at | θt, at−1) =
qˆ(at | at−1) exp (u(at, θt) + δE [V (at, θt+1) | θt])∑
a′
t
qˆ(a′t | at−1) exp (u(a
′
t, θt) + δE [V (a
′
t, θt+1) | θt])
, (26)
where the continuation payoffs solve
V (at−1, θt) = log
(∑
at
qˆ(at | at−1) exp (u(at, θt) + δE [V (at, θt+1) | θt])
)
, (27)
the predispositions qˆ(at | at−1) solve
∑
θt−1
pip(θt−1 | at−1)γ(θt−1, θt) =
∑
at
qˆ(at | at−1)pi
p(θt | at) (28)
for all θt and at−1, and the posteriors pˆi
p(θt | at) ≡
∑
θt−1 pi
p((θt−1, θt) | (a
t−1, at))
satisfy
pˆip(θt | at)
pˆip(θt | a′t)
=
exp (u(at, θt) + δE[V (at, θt+1) | θt])
exp (u(a′t, θt) + δE[V (a
′
t, θt+1) | θt])
. (29)
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Proof. The result follows directly from Proposition 3. It suﬃces to verify that pˆ(at |
θt, at−1) and qˆ(at | at−1) solve the static RI problem at each at−1.
Proof of Proposition 5. For each a ∈ {0, 1}, let pia denote the posterior pˆip(θt = 1 |
at = a), and pia the prior pˆip(θt = 1 | at−1 = a) ≡
∑
θt−1 pip((θ
t−1, 1) | (at−2, a))
associated with the stationary solution when t is suﬃciently large. Since the expected
posterior is equal to the prior, we have qˆ(a|a)pia + qˆ(1 − a|a)pi1−a = pia for each
a ∈ {0, 1}. Together with qˆ(a | a) + qˆ(1− a | a) = 1, these two equations imply
qˆ(a | a)− qˆ(a | 1− a) =
pia − pi1−a
pia − pi1−a
for each a. Substituting pia = pi
aγ(1, 1)+(1−pia)γ(0, 1) and the analogous expression
for pi1−a leads to qˆ(a | a)− qˆ(a | 1−a) = γ(1, 1)−γ(0, 1) = γ(1, 1)+γ(0, 0)−1, which
is positive since states have positive persistence. That pˆ(a | θ, a) > pˆ(a | θ, 1− a) for
each a follows from this last result together with (26).
For part 2, suppose without loss of generality that a = 1. Consider a static RI
problem with Θ = A = {0, 1} and payoﬀs u(a, θ) satisfying u(a, a) ≡ ua > 0 and
u(1 − a, a) = 0 for each a ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose moreover that the solution is interior.
By (9),
pi1s
pi0s
= exp u1 and
1− pi1s
1− pi0s
= exp(−u0),
where pias denotes the posterior pi
p(θ = 1 | a). It is straightforward to verify that the
posteriors pi1s and pi
0
s solving these two equations decrease in u1 and increase in u0.
Now consider the dynamic problem. By Proposition 3 and Lemma 6, the so-
lution is the same as in a static RI problem with payoﬀs uˆ(at, θt) = uat1at=θt +
δE [V (at, θt+1; u1) | θt], where V (at, θt+1; u1) solves (27) (given u1). By the previous
paragraph, it suﬃces to prove that the payoﬀ diﬀerence uˆ(1, θ)− uˆ(0, θ) increases in
u1 for each θ ∈ {0, 1}, which follows if V (1, θ; u1)−V (0, θ; u1) increases in u1 for each
θ ∈ {0, 1}.
Diﬀerentiating (27) gives
∂
∂u1
V (at−1, θt; u1) = pˆ(1 | θt, at−1) + δE
[
∂
∂u1
V (at, θt+1; u1) | at−1, θt
]
. (30)
Letting d(at, θt) := pˆ(at | θt, 1)−pˆ(at | θt, 0) and ∆(θt; u1) := V (1, θt; u1)−V (0, θt; u1),
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(30) implies
∂
∂u1
∆(θt; u1) = d(1, θt) + δE
[
d(1, θt)
∂
∂u1
V (1, θt+1; u1) | θt
]
+ δE
[
d(0, θt)
∂
∂u1
V (0, θt+1; u1) | θt
]
= d(1, θt) + δE
[
d(1, θt)
∂
∂u1
∆(θt+1; u1) | θt
]
,
where the last equality follows from the identity d(a, θt) ≡ −d(1 − a, θt). Iterating
gives
∂
∂u1
∆(θt; u1) =
∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−tE
[
t′∏
t′′=t
d(1, θt′′) | θt
]
.
By part 1 of the proposition, d(1, θt) > 0 for each θt, and hence
∂
∂u1
∆(θt; u1) > 0.
C.3 Response times
Proof of Proposition 6. Since actions following any at−1 6= wt−1 are payoﬀ-irrelevant,
the problem has a solution in which the agent acquires information only before the
ﬁrst terminal action; that is, if σt−1(xt−1) 6= wt−1 then I(θ; xt | x
t−1) = 0. We restrict
attention to solutions of this form.
Note that the system of constraints in (17) together with the preceding paragraph
imply
E
[
I
(
θ; xt | x
t−1
)]
≤ κPr
(
σt−1
(
xt−1
)
= wt−1
)
for all t = 1, . . . , T.
Taking partial sums gives
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ; xτ | x
τ−1
)]
≤ κ
t∑
τ=1
Pr
(
στ−1
(
xτ−1
)
= wτ−1
)
for all t = 1, . . . , T.
In addition, if at = σt(xt), then
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ; aτ | a
τ−1
)]
= I(θ; at) ≤ I(θ; xt) =
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ; xτ | x
τ−1
)]
.
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Therefore, the value of the problem
max
p
E
[ T∑
t=1
ut
(
at, θ
) ]
(31)
s.t.
t∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ; aτ | a
τ−1
)]
≤ κ
t∑
τ=1
Pr
(
aτ−1 = wτ−1
)
for all t = 1, . . . , T
is an upper bound on the value of problem (17). Thus if we ﬁnd a choice rule p∗
solving (31), and construct a strategy (f, σ) feasible in (17) that generates p∗, then
(f, σ) solves (17).
Since the set of choice rules satisfying the constraints in (31) is convex and the
objective is linear in p, the ﬁrst-order conditions are suﬃcient for a global optimum.
For each t, let λ˜t ≥ 0 denote the shadow price of the constraint in (31) for t. Consider
the problem
max
p
E
[ T∑
t=1
(
ut(a
t, θ) + λt+1κ1at=wt − λtI(θ; at | a
t−1)
) ]
, (32)
where λT+1 = 0, and λt =
∑T
τ=t λ˜τ for each t = 1, . . . , T . We will use Proposition 3
to ﬁnd a solution to (32) with λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λT = c/κ, and then show that, for a
range of values of c, this solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions for (31).
The only non-trivial decision node in each period t is at−1 = wt−1. Each of these
nodes is associated with a unique belief about θ, which, by symmetry, is the uniform
belief. Symmetry also implies that, for each t, the continuation value Vt(w
t−1, θ) is
independent of θ; accordingly, we omit the arguments of Vt. Multiplying the objective
by κ/c to eliminate the λt coeﬃcient on the mutual information term and applying
Proposition 3 implies that, at each node wt−1, the solution corresponds to that of the
static RI problem with a uniform prior over θ and payoﬀs
uˆt (at, θ) =


κ/c if at = θ,
0 if at = 1− θ,
κ(Vt+1 − c+ κc/κ)/c if at = w,
where VT+1 := 0. Note that the last expression simpliﬁes to uˆt(w, θ) = κVt+1/c.
We solve this static RI problem using Proposition 2. By symmetry, the rate rt
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satisﬁes rt/2 = qt(0 | w
t−1) = qt(1 | w
t−1) for each t. By (7), the accuracy satisﬁes
gt =
exp(κ/c)
1+exp(κ/c)
for each t.
Since action w is dominated at T by a uniform mixture of 0 and 1, rT = 1. By (12),
the value associated with the static RI problem at time T (including the rescaling
by κ/c) is κVT /c = log
(
1
2
(exp(κ/c) + 1)
)
. Proposition 2 implies that, for each t, rt
solves
max
rt∈[0,1]
log
(rt
2
(exp(κ/c) + 1) + (1− rt) exp(κVt+1/c)
)
. (33)
This problem is solved by any rt ∈ [0, 1] if and only if κVt+1/c = log
(
1
2
(exp(κ/c) + 1)
)
,
in which case Vt = Vt+1. Proceeding recursively from period T back to period 1, it
follows that, for each r ∈ (0, 1), there is a solution with r1 = · · · = rT−1 = r.
For this to solve (31), r must be such that the constraints are satisﬁed. Note that,
since gt =
exp(κ/c)
1+exp(κ/c)
for each t,
T∑
τ=1
E
[
I
(
θ; aτ | a
τ−1
)]
= I(θ; aT ) = h (1/2)− h
(
exp(κ/c)
1 + exp(κ/c)
)
,
where h(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). Since the constraint for period T in (31)
is binding, r must satisfy
h (1/2)− h
(
exp(κ/c)
1 + exp(κ/c)
)
= κ
T∑
τ=1
(1− r)τ−1. (34)
The left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in c, while the right-hand side ranges
from κ to κT as r ranges from 1 to 0. By assumption, h(1/2) > κT , and hence there
exist c and c (whose values depend on κ) such that (34) has a solution r ∈ (0, 1)
whenever c ∈ (c, c). Since gt is constant, I(θ; a
t) = Pr(at 6= wt)κ
∑T
τ=1(1 − r)
τ−1 for
each t, from which it is straightforward to verify that the constraints in (31) hold for
each period t < T . In addition, because λt = λT for each t < T , the shadow price
λ˜t of the constraint for t is 0, and that for the binding constraint at T is positive.
Therefore, the choice rule corresponding to gt ≡
exp(κ/c)
1+exp(κ/c)
and rt ≡ r satisfying (34)
solves (31).
All that remains is to construct a strategy (f, σ) satisfying the system of con-
straints in (17) that generates this choice rule. Without loss of generality, let 0,
1, w0, and w1 be distinct elements of X, and let W = {w0, w1}. Let σ satisfy
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σt(x
t) = xt if xt ∈ {0, 1} and σt(x
t) = w if xt ∈ W . Let the information strat-
egy f satisfy Pr(xt = 0 | x
t−1 ∈ W t−1) = Pr(xt = 1 | x
t−1 ∈ W t−1) = rt/2 and
Pr(xt = w0 | x
t−1 ∈ W t−1) = Pr(xt = w1 | x
t−1 ∈ W t−1) = (1 − rt)/2 for ev-
ery t, and generate the following posteriors: if xt−1 ∈ W t−1 and xt = a ∈ {0, 1}
then Pr(θ = a | xt) = g; and if xt−1 ∈ W t−1 and xt = wa for a ∈ {0, 1} then
Pr(θ = a | xt) = g˜t, where g˜t satisﬁes
h (1/2)− h(g˜t) = κ
T∑
τ=T−t+1
(1− r)τ−1. (35)
Since g˜t is increasing and smaller than g for all t < T , there exists an information
strategy generating these posteriors. Equation (35) is equivalent to
(h (1/2)− h (g˜t)) (1− r)
t +
(
1− (1− r)t
)
κ
T∑
τ=1
(1− r)τ−1 = κ
t∑
τ=1
(1− r)τ−1.
For t = 1, this together with (34) implies that the capacity constraint is binding.
Proceeding inductively, the constraint binds at every wt.
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